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In today s world, clearly defined threats are growing less common. For nations in transition,
there are internal threats that may pose as much danger as those oj an external nature. Threat
analysis impacts heavily on deJence and military budgets, as it does in the broader security
sector in organizations such as police or border guards. By the nature oj armed Jorces, the
military services compete Jor scarce resources, each seeking to provide Jor the highest possi-
ble readiness oj their service. As threat and risk analysis proceeds, each level in the military,
MOD, government and parliaments, have responsibilities to ensure the accuracy oj this
information. Each level oj review is obliged to identify the most credible and critical threats,
to prioritise, and to justify the prioritisation. Only through such a process can funding be
allocated in a manner that will provide Jor the most effective capabilities oj armed Jorces, to
ensure they are prepared to address the threats.
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1. Introduction
It is clear to those who have spent time analysing
and defining threats how important it is to do this well.
It is not always as clear how to identify some of the more
subtle internal non-traditional threats. For defence and
military planners, it should be apparent that the work
they do in developing an accurate threat analysis is an
essential part ofthe equation used by political leaders to
evaluate the form and substance of a nation's armed
forces, to determine what resources are necessary to cre-
ate and sustain defence and military establishments that
are capable of successfully dealing with these threats,
should it become necessary to do so.
If threat analysis has become an art, it is an im-
perfect one, even when threats can be clearly defined.
In today's world, clearly defined threats are growing less
common. In Southeastern Europe (SEE) there are no
forces poised on the borders, threatening other nations,
and yet, very real threats exist, threats of instability, with
the potential to disrupt a nation's progress towards a sta-
ble, democratic future. For nations in transition, there
are internal threats that may pose as much danger as those
of an external nature.
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The first section of this paper offers a brief clari-
fication of how certain terms are used. The second dis-
cusses prioritising threats and risks. In the third section
the relationship between determining threats and the
budget process is explored. Finally, an examination of
the threat environment is presented, in which the nature
and relevance of non-traditional internal threats are dis-
cussed.
2. Clarifying Terms
To set the stage, two of the terms to be used are
going to be briefly clarified, information and intelligence.
They are often used interchangeably, however, for many
defence and military planners they are quite different.
Information is the raw material, so to speak, gathered by
various sources, both human and technological. Having
said this, military terms are sometimes confusing in their
own construction. We speak of HUMINT, human intel-
ligence; SIGINT, signals intelligence; COMMINT, com-
munications intelligence, and similar terms. These terms
refer to an end product, intelligence, understanding that
what comes, initially, from these sources is not intelli-
gence, but information. Only after the information is
analysed by trained analysts is intelligence produced,
and as one might assume, the ratio of information to
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4. The Threat Environmentintelligence is very high. This clarification is intended
for the purpose of the author's comments, and does not
presuppose universal acceptance. Additionally, for sim-
plicity sake, the word "threat" will be used to be inclu-
sive of "risks".
The title of this presentation has been reordered
from Risks and Threats, to Threats and Risks, to accu-
rately reflect the order in which the process is conducted.
The first step is to identify the threat, only then can the
process begin to determine the risks associated with that
threat. In most situations not only must individual threats
be prioritised, but the associated risks as well. Con-
strained resources are a fact of life for military prepar-
edness, or readiness, and therefore it is necessary to
prioritise risks in order to determine those that are ac-
ceptable and unacceptable, so that a proper allocation
offunding can be made to highest priority unacceptable
risks. History is replete with examples of battles lost as
a result of resources arrayed against the wrong threats or
risks. Perhaps less dramatic are the circumstances of pro-
longed struggles of governments to conduct reforms
based on an equally inadequate array of resources, but
also due to a failure to recognise the importance of non-
traditional internal threats.
3. Threats and Budgets
Threat analysis impacts Iieavily on defence and
military budgets, as it does in the broader security sec-
tor in organizations such as police or border guards. Once
threats are identified, the military uses this information,
and intelligence, to establish priorities for their limited
resources. In well functioning democracies, defence and
military establishments are obliged to justify their de-
mands for resources, both human and capital resources,
and both internally as well as to their parliaments which
control the resources. Responsible governments demand
detailed information, and intelligence, that confirm the
nature of threats against the nation's national security
interests, foremost among them, its population.
By the nature of armed forces, the military serv-
ices compete for scarce resources, each seeking to pro-
vide for the highest possible readiness of their service.
With the rapid advances in technology applicable to
military hardware, the cost of equipment is spiralling
upwards. In such an environment, civilian leadership are
faced with the task of assessing the needs, and
prioritising. The analytical development of threats and
risks provides national leaders with a key tool for assist-
ing in this prioritisation. As threat and risk analysis pro-
ceeds, each level in the military, MOD, government and
parliaments, have responsibiiities to ensure the accuracy
of this information. Each level of review is obliged to
identify the most credible and critical threats, to
prioritise, and to justify the prioritisation. Only through
such a process can funding be allocated in a manner that
will provide for the most effective capabilities of armed
forces, to ensure they are prepared to address the threats.
The identification of threats has evolved over time
from a national process to one that involves groups of
countries, coalitions, or alliances. Perhaps the most sig-
nificant example ofthis in the 20th century is that of the
cold war, with NATO and the Warsaw Pact (WP) repre-
senting organisations that viewed one another as their
greatest threat. To illustrate the importance of the value
of addressing internal threats, the example of NATO is
provided. With the disintegration of the WP it was not
long before many pundits were calling for the dissolu-
tion of NATO, since, they argued - and some still do - it
had lost its 'raison d'etre. ' While reading the articles
and papers, listening to the presentations and interviews
on this argument for NATO to close its doors, one was
struck at the lack of depth of understanding. Perhaps one
of the greatest strengths and accomplishments of NATO
was not the fact that it emerged from the cold war intact,
but what it accomplished in terms of the integration of
its members, the mutual trust and confidence that evolved
over the years, the fact that it kept its member states
from fighting with one another, and, indeed, worked
constantly to address and resolve problems among and
between its members.
Beyond collective security and defence, this as-
pect of the value of NATO applies as much today as
ever. At the heart of NATO's modus operandi is the de-
fence planning process, the transparent, above-the-table
discussion and sharing of information oriented towards
common benefit. It is also worth recalling that at the
time of its creation, NATO's stated practice of transpar-
ent defence planning was not reflected in the practice of
many of its subsequent members.
How does this relate to the threat environment?
Once this 'greater good,' as it might be called, of NATO's
accomplishments is recognised, its continued value must
also be recognised, for it has dealt effectively with its in-
ternal threats, contributing in most significant ways to the
well-being and prosperity of the Euro Atlantic countries,
NATO and non-NATO alike. The threat environment
changed dramatically between 1989 and 1991, however,
NATO's proven ability to deal effectively with its inter-
nal threats, made it the ideal candidate, along side the
EU, to put these skills to work in the form of the Partner-
ship for Peace, Today this 'greater good' may be said to
have even more significance, and need, than in the past,
as the Alliance continues to deepen its interaction with
the Partnership countries, encouraging and assisting in the
development of effective democratic forms of governance.
It is important for the governments in transition
countries to be aware of internal threats that for the most
part are of a more subtle nature than a threatened mili-
tary conflict, though of course, they are related. In SEE,
and in other Partnership countries, the threat environ-
ment does not include the likelihood of armed forces of
one nation, planning, or poised to threaten the sover-
eignty of another. But the threat arising from instability
persists, and is certainly viewed as significant in this
and other regions.
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Many of the internal threats are not yet recog-
nised as such, or as part ofthe threat environment. Within
MODs and the military, work is progressing in putting
into place democratic systems. The development of pol i-
cies and management systems, and their effective im-
plementation require competent and willing people, hu-
man capital, and an adequate investment in this capital.
Good leaders, managers, and staff officers, both
civilian and military, constitute the key to success in any
organisation. An old adage in leadership education states
that leadership does not emerge from blind obedience
to anyone. This adage was restated by the corporate
leader of one of the world's most successful international
corporations, when he warned senior managers that 'If
you have a yes-man working for you, one of you is re-
dundant. ' His meaning was that effective leaders encour-
age the development of their people rather than stifle it.
The essence of good leadership and good management
extends across professional, and national boundaries.
Investing in Human Capital requires good leaders and
managers. To be effective, leaders must encourage peo-
ple to challenge the process. Not surprisingly, in an en-
vironment where staff officers are encouraged to express
their opinions and ideas, the best solutions to problems
rise to the attention of decision-makers.
In terms of Human Capital, and optimising this
capital, a number of steps are necessary. On the military
side, professional education systems, that embody the
principles of democratic governance, must be developed,
and refined. The content of the courses, in essence, are
likely to be similar to those in NATO nations, while ob-
viously accounting and providing for individual national
requirements. Work remains to be done in developing
expertise in teaching staffs, and designating teaching
positions as truly career enhancing. These will help to
attract the best into the faculties, and therefore improve
the quality of the education.
5. Internal Threats
(Non-Traditional)
Personnel systems within the military continue to
evolve. The legacy of history, and the culture still, too
often, gives witness to many key positions being filled
based on friendships, or where one is from, rather than as
a result of a professional personnel selection process. This
dilemma is also reflected in the promotion system, where
many young and competent officers question the current
system's ability to recognize and reward their skills. As
we have seen in so many other transition countries, until
merit based systems are put into place, many of the best
and brightest young officers become frustrated, and look
to the private sector for better opportunities, as economic
conditions improve. Neither MODs, nor the military can
afford to lose their best and brightest.
Equitable pay, allowances, and benefits are also
undergoing review and change. Unreasonable pay dif-
ferentials for personnel of the same grade must be re-
viewed. In those nations where the differential, or dif-
ferent amounts of pay, includes officers ofthe same rank,
serving in either a tactical unit or on the GS, this tends
to frustrate a rotation process that would more effec-
tively balance officer's skills and experience, and there-
fore better prepare them for more senior responsibili-
ties. In some countries, where moving expenses are born
by the officers, and government housing is not sufficient
to meet demands, geographic reassignments also pose a
difficult problem. The result, particularly in cases where
the spouse works - keeping in mind high unemployment
and the desirability and fiscal practicality of working
wives - is that all too often the officer moves and the
family does not. As we begin to combine such factors, a
picture emerges of personnel systems that do not ad-
equately facilitate professional development, or encour-
age a military career for many.
These "people issues" are characteristic, for the
most part, of all transition nations, and beyond the policy
and management aspects, many are heavily impacted by
the state of the nation's economy, and hence linked to
budgets. Identifying the problems and reviewing current
policies, with the intent to find and implement remedies,
are the first steps. In this regard, the level of activity in
bringing about change in most countries in the region
has been increasing, and as senior leadership become
more aware of the value, indeed the necessity of invest-
ing adequately in their human capital, the pace of effec-
tive change in this area will increase.
On the civilian side ofthe equation there is a need
to create a professional civil service. There is much dis-
cussion in conferences, workshops, and seminars about
the requirement for the military to develop, as part of
their ethic, an abiding respect for DCAF, to include the
role and authority of civilian leadership. As MODs fo-
cus on reform of the military, this must go hand-in-hand
with improving the competence of the civilian profes-
sionals. Very often the pace of the former exceeds that
of the latter, for "the system" tends to impose greater
pressure on the military.
This is not particularly surprising, especially in
those transition nations that inherited some semblance
of a military force, where officers had an understanding
of their system. While the policies, systems and proce-
dures they are familiar with, were often very different
from those practices in mature democracies, neverthe-
less, many officers came with an understanding of train-
ing and education, logistics, maintenance, mobilization,
force deployments, procurement, personnel manage-
ment, and many other aspects of the complex nature of
defence and military establishments. In contrast, most
civilians entered this environment with little or no ex-
perience, and the daily demands of managing these large
complexes, while providing an "on the job'" education,
must be augmented, particularly for the mid and lower
level staff. Professional civil service career programs are
needed to address this shortcoming. In terms of human
capital, the threat posed by an insufficient or inadequate
investment, is that the ability of defence and military
establishments to affect real reform will be hobbled.
Regarding defence planning and management
systems, without these being effective the threat is that
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democratic control of armed forces will remain elusive,
and stated goals and objectives are either partially or
wholly unrealised.
It is difficult to establish control over defence
planning, or to be effective in planning, in the absence
of good management tools; or, in other words, in the
absence of an adequate defence planning system. When
we speak of control, not only are we talking about as-
pects such as civilian personnel in key positions in the
MODs, and parliamentary oversight, and an effective
public debate on issues of national security and defence,
but also we want to be talking about the accountability
of both civilian and military personnel in the MODs and
GSs. Without formal management systems, there is no
effective accountability which, by the way, is one ofthe
reasons why it takes so long for these systems to really
come alive. There is not always a great rush to be ac-
countable, especially by those who benefit from its ab-
sence.
If, for example, a GS does not effectively em-
ploy formal systems for determining requirements, or
projecting expenditures, or for how money is spent, and
tracking expenditures, they will not have adequate data
for their leaders to use to address the many questions
associated with budgeting. This works its way through
the MOD, and up to the parliament, where the tough
questions about where the money is going, and why, and
what the priorities are, and why, need to be asked (and
adequately answered), and there is the need for parlia-
mentarians to be able to draw upon more than just the
MODs and GSs for their information.
When we speak of democratic control of defence
policy, we are generally referring to control and over-
sight of the development of policy. More specifically,
and importantly, we are referring, to the development of
the management systems and programs that flow from
policy, in effect, the policy tools. And even further, we
assume, often incorrectly, that the policies almost auto-
matically result in effective management systems, and
that they will actually be implemented in the intended
spirit of the policies. Just as strategic documents (Na-
tional Security Strategies, White Papers, etc.), stating
that defence planning and budgeting will be transpar-
ent, often do not result in such transparency, policies
directing effective budgeting, realistic force structures,
rational acquisition systems, or force readiness, often
do not reach their goals. One of the primary reasons for
this is the lack of effective management systems and/or
a failure to properly implement or enforce the systems
where they exist.
Effective management systems provide more than
the rationale for such things as force restructuring or force
modernization; they also provide a medium in which
we can build more effective CMR. When they are not in
place or not enforced, there is a strong likelihood that
the wrong requirements may be identified for funding.
We have seen over the past 10 years many examples of
Partner nations funding NATO related activities or pur-
chases, only to find later that due in large part to the
absence of formal systems for determining requirements,
the funding was misplaced, or that sufficient funding
was not available to support the activities they have
signed up for, or materiel they have committed to pur-
chase. There are certainly instances where the military
have agreed at the outset that the goals can be reached,
without having conducted the necessary analysis to sup-
port this, but it is also the case where the civilian leader-
ship makes commitments, at times for strictly political
purposes, that are beyond the ability of the military to
meet. Inevitably, such outcomes lead to a search for the
guilty, and increased conflict in CMR.
6. Conclusion
The non-traditional internal threats that have dis-
cussed are obviously not the only ones we have to be
concerned with. The intention has been to discuss the
threat posed by the lack or inadequacy of both ministe-
rial and inter-agency crisis management systems. How-
ever, a passage from a report dated in Feb 1999, of the
International Defence Advisory Board to the Baltic coun-
tries will be offered for your consideration, which stated,
"We see the need to construct, embed, and practice on a
regular basis the mechanisms required for the efficient
functioning of a government in times of crisis or
emergency ...The study and understanding of the skills
of crisis warning, prevention and management, both in-
ternally and with partners, should feature as a high pri-
ority in the early future." Dr. Trapans, a former MOD in
Latvia, will surely be happy to discuss the relevance of
this statement with those who are interested. Another
threat is that of ineffective oversight of the defence and
military establishments on the part of governments, par-
liaments or both.
In summary, it is clear to all of us that the general
security environment includes a rather discomforting
number of concerns; among them, international terror-
ism, economic and political instability, organised crime,
the proliferation and transfer of WMD, and unresolved
border issues. These, and others, receive a rather high
level of attention in the development of threat analyses.
In contrast, the comments here were focused on the more
subtle, internal issues of the transition process in SEE,
for these issues contain threats of a different nature, that
if not dealt with effectively, will preclude governments
from addressing the familiar threats with any degree of
success.
Threats associated with human capital and man-
agement systems will not be found on the checklists of
intelligence analysts, however, if they are absent from
the checklists of senior MOD and military leaders, the
work of the analysts will be of limited value. •
